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THE PROBLEM of oil imports1 poses many of the almost insoluble
economic problems that are common to the import of any com-
modity. The dimensions of the problem are, however, probably broader
and deeper than those of most other commodities. Oil not only is in-
volved in the turbulence of America's domestic politics,2 but it has a
keen impact on global strategy and world politics3 Oil is big business
and is numbered among our ten largest industries.4 In the year prior
to the imposition of the 1957 voluntary quota system, oil imports were
exceeded in dollar volume only by those of coffee.5
Defense and diplomacy, both involved in the oil import equation, do
not always dictate the same course of action. While it is in the interest
of diplomacy to foster free trade6 among friendly nations, it is just as
urgent a requirement of defense that oil, incapable of being stockpiled,
be available in sufficient quantity in the event these nations are no longer
friendly. Protection and fostering of foreign investment is also at
stake.
*A.B. x946, Ball State Teachers College; J.D. 1948, Indiana University. LL.!.
(Oil & Gas) z961, Southern Methodist University. Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy.
Appellate Government Counsel, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
1 For a history of the federal government's exercise of its powers over oil in foreign
commerce, see ELY, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 656-63 (x948) ; CLARK, THE OIL
CENTURY 229-54 (958).
'See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 31, 1959, § x , p. x2M, cols. x-6.
'Id. at 14 M, cols. 1-8. 'Id. at i2M, cols. 1-6.
U.S. Imports: Retarding the Inevitable, 24 PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE 322 ( 957)-
* 60 DEP'T STATE BULL. 308 (.959).
FANNING, FOREIGN OIL AND THE FREE WORLD 266-So (1954). The statement
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The goals of husbanding and restricting production of domestic
reserves and of providing incentive for exploration and development of
still further reserves (also to be properly conserved) perhaps appear as
contradictions of 'policy as well. But policies and courses of action in
this-field are not-clear-cut. They rather tend to blend into the twilight
Bf uncert.ihty and experiment.' For example, just eight daysbefore the
Presidential Proclamation establishing a mandatory quota system for the
imports of oil in March 1959,8 the State Department Bulletin, in the
recitation of some excerpts Trom the economic report of the'President,
alluded to the United States policy of eventually eliminating trade
barriers. 9 Prior to the imposition of the mandatory quota system, the
federal government import policy was described as "pusillanimous,"
as abdicating to the states the determination of national supply and
price, and as calling upon the large oil firms to play the role of the
statesmen that the elected representatives were not assumring.' 0
* The sobering part of the im port problem as it applies to oil is that
this commodity is so vital,to ourecbhtny" and to our defense.' 2  While
-there have always been dscoveries to keep the reserves in pace with their
use, there is certainly aimit to the domestic supply. This presages that
:we shall become' increasingly more dependent on foreign oil in the
of Oscar L. Chapman, Petroleum Administrator for Defense, made at an address before
e American Petroleum' Instatute in x95z is quoted in part at page 276: .... at present
we do not begin to have the reserve we should have in order ,to. provide, not absolutb
security, but just the minimum of security that would give use room or maneuver in
f$he opening months of, a war. Our only consolation can be that at the moment the
Soviet and its satellites have much less oil than we do, only about one-eleventh in fact.
But then that's a'blance tLt could all too easily be disturbed almost overnight."
'PresidentNlI:Proclamation No. 3279, 24. Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959).
6o DEP'T- STATE BULL. 3o8 (1959). Coincidentally, this same report makes
mention of. the, diflnculty that United States coal was encountering in foreign markets.
Coal interests, being willhing to recapture some of the domestic market which has been
lost to oil and natural gas, have a keen interest in oil imports. 1*::
20 DE CHAZFAU & KAHN, IN'IfECPIATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM
"INDUSTRY 253 (959). This source advocates at page '2s2: ". . . mandatory unitiza-
'tion for all .producing pools throughout'this country under federal law."
"'In 1958 , petoleum was, &e sot~rce of more than 45% of all energy used in "the
'Uiited States. 'Natural gas wai the source of over ±6%. N.Y. Times, May 3!, 5959)
11, P. 13M, 'C61. I-
"2 If, as was said by Lord Curzon, The Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil inI
World War I, they gushed to victory in World War II. In World War 1, it is re-
ported by. FANNfi , o.' cit. supra riote 7, at z67, that to operate the Air 'Force 24
li6'urs, 4- times as muicli gasoline was necessary as was sli1ped to Europe for all purposes
Sduring World War I.
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future" and indicates that our policy toward foreign oil until such time
should be such as to assure that it will be there when needed. HdO@
soon we shall need it and how much we shall need are just:added un-
certainties in the already lengthy and fuzzy equation.
B. Beginning of Concern Over Oil Imports,
Mexico and Venezuela exported oil to the United States early ii
the twentieth century. It was only in the 193o's, however, that some
concern over oil imports began to manifest itself.14 This was attributable
to domestic prices and proration. 13 With the overabundance, of pro-
duction from the Oklahoma fields and the newly found East Texas fields
adding to the supply, the wasteful prodigality of "find, produce quickly,
and sell at any price" begot hard-fought conservation measures, such as
proration and well-spacing. The mere prevention of, physical ,and
economic waste through domestic conservation measures was not satis-
factory to producers, however, when the price could be held down bV
cheap imports. Congressmen from oil-producing. states objected, ac-
cusing the large integrated and foreign operating oil companies, of
propagandizing for restriction of domestic production in order to create
a home market for cheaply-produced and duty-free foreign oilP', There
was a clamor for high tariff or legislative quotas on imports or both;-
As a result, the Internal Revenue Act of 1932 levied a tax of Y2 cent
per gallon on imported petroleum, 292 cents per gallon on, gasoline or
motor fuels, and four cents per gallon on lubricating oil.1' -It has been
suggested that this was a compromise measure; that some would have
The Compulsory Cut in U.S. Imports, z6 PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE Iz6 (1959)-
"The development of indigenous shale oil."production may help to postpone th'e time
when the United States becomes increasingly dependent on imports. But that time
will certainly come." Cf., KNOWLES, THE GREATEST GAMBLERS 338 (1959), wherein
one of the interesting results of the Pratt and Weeks researches is recited as: "In the
U.S., explorers have drilled one exploratory well for each 9.4. square miles of favor-
able land, whereas throughout the rest of the World one exploritory well has been
drilled for each x,ioo square miles of favorable land."
1" CLARK, op. cit. supra note i, at 2z93 Hardwicke, Adequacy of Our Mineral Fuels,
Annals, May 1952, p. 55.
" RISTER, OIL! TITAN OF THE SOUTHWEST 35-26 (1949). See also GLASSCOCK,
THEN CAME OIL 307-1 (193).
1 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 231, reports that. Congressman Garber from
Oklahoma produced figures showing that oil could'be delivered to the east coast for 75
cents per barrel, compared to $1.75 per barrel of, midcontinent oil.
17Int. Rev.. Code of 1932, h. 209, § 6oi, 47 Stat..5 9 . As a measure with the
combined purposes of taxation and regulation of foreign commerce,, this statute was
upheld in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil'Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (.940).
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imposed a one dollar per barrel tax on crude oil, while others would
have, by quota, restricted imports to about one-quarter of the i929 and
1930 levels.' 8
At about this same time, Governor Murray of Oklahoma formed
the Oil States Advisory Committee, which was generally concerned
with the conservation of petroleum and the economic stresses of the
industry. This Committee was the predecessor of the Interstate Com-
pact. 9 Some of the governor members of the Committee solicited the
aid of President Hoover to restrict imports. Owing to the President's
influence (and perhaps to a threat of higher import restrictions and
taxes), the larger companies cooperated in a voluntary reduction of
imports in the amount of twenty-five per cent, using the year 193o as a
base. This probably softened the congressional impulse to enact strong
import restrictions.
In 1933, the Petroleum Code, which was established under the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 0 authorized a quota on oil
imports that the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ickes, put into force on
September 2, 1933. The calculation of the allowable imports was
based upon the actual imports during the last half of 1932 and amounted
to 4.5 per cent of the daily domestic requirements.2 ' This mandatory
quota went out with the "sick chicken" case,22 but the large companies
(again, probably mindful of the congressional temper to assist the oil-
producing states in their economic difficulties),23 kept the imports at
"about the same percentages permitted under the Code." 4
As the i93o's drew to a dose, the philosophy of conservation had
,acquired considerable momentum. Production control by administrative
agencies had become the accepted rule. 5 The year 193 however, saw
a divergence in state and federal objectives. Then, the Texas Railroad
Commission was much concerned over the low prices resulting from
oversupply.. Colonel Thompson, a dominant figure on the Commission,
wrote and published a letter to the Governor:2"
"' ELY, op. cit. supra note x.
9 MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY 545-55 (x948).
2048 Stat. x95 (1933). 2 CLARK, op,. cit. supra note I, at 239.
S chechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (x935).
One manifestation of this congressional temper was the passage of the Connally
"Hot Oil" Act in 1935, which sought to assist the states in their attempts to control
the amount of production. 49 Stat. 30, 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1958).
"' ELY, O. cit. supra note x, at 657.
"Davis and Willbern, 4drainitrative Controls of Oil Production in Texas, 2z
TEXAS L. REV. 149 (1943)-
" Id. at 155. " .
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This cut [twenty per cent] is wholly unwarranted . . . I am advocating
to my colleagues on the Railroad Commission that we shut down all Texas oil
fields for thirty days.
This was the same year in which the federal government, by a reciprocal
trade agreement, halved the excise tax on oil imports from Venezuela,
providing Venezuelan'exports to the United States did not exceed five
per cent of our previous year's crude run.'
C. World War II and Naval Petroleum Reserves
World War II left the question of imports versus domestic pro-
duction in a state of suspension. But while World War II was a balm
to the problem of domestic overproduction, it was a catalyst to the
problem of imports. The oil industry rose to the task demanded of it,
but the drain on our resources was tremendous. For instance, from
December 7, I941, to June 30, 1946, the Defense Supplies Corporation
purchased almost 132,000,000,000 gallons of ioo octane aviation gaso-
line.2s
The Naval Petroleum Reserves had been created, commencing in
i912, with a view toward preservation in the ground of oil for the
Navy's use in emergencies and' military purposes. Although these
reserves served their intended purpose during World War II, the
occasion required more-a total mobilization of the industry. The
O'Mahoney Committee, after making a 1945 survey of petroleum
supply in 1945, reported that2 9
the total estimated recoverable oil from the three Naval Petroleum Reserves,
other than Alaska, it only 376,ooo,ooo barrels. It is obvious that the amount
of oil producible from these modest reserves would constitute but slight
assistance in the event of war....
Albeit inadequate to meet the demands of total war, the idea of the
Naval Petroleum Reserves (now including Oil Shale Reserves) is, from
the standpoint of national security, hardly assailable. On the contrary,
ELY, op. cit. iupra note x, at 658.
"' CLARK, op. cit. supra note x, at 241. Clark also reports that the United States
had produced 63.2% of all oil produced in the world up through 195o, having then
only 26% of the world's reserves.
" ELY, op. cit. supra note x, at 622. Pressure for discontinuance of the Naval
Petroleum Reserves has been unrelenting and sometimes successful. See, for an interest-
ing historic account, WENER, TEAPoT DOME (1959). The quoted statement
has since proven to be in gross error. There is now an estimated reserve of over
1,000,000,000 barrels in the Navy's Elk Hills, California, field alone.
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it has become contagious. It is now realized from the less6ns of World
War II that our total reserves, indeed, the reserves of the Western
Hemisphere, must be counted as critical for future security planning:
In this milieu, the Navy's policy has served as precedent for later gov-
ernment planning and action. In a recent pamphlet, such policy was
dedared: 30.
Navy's policy as to the future administration of the Naval Petroleum Reserves
will be, as it has been in the past, that there shall be the maximum conservation
of the oil consistent with the needs of the national security. The Navy has
regarded itself as charged by Congress with the responsibility for maintaining
its present holdings of oil as a reserve in the ground, insofar as that can possibli
b6 achieved, and for restricting production to the minimum necessary to
maintain the field in a state of readiness.
It is abundantly clear, from the Navy's experience, that frugality is
the best way to improve ones relative position in the possession of oil
reserves:'1
The oil reserves in the Naval Petroleum Reserve No. i are now in excess of
25 0 of those on.the West Coast, and this Petroleum Reserve may expect to
grow in stature as the domestic reserves of oil, not only on the V.Test'Coast,
but also throughout the United States, dwindle.
The Navy's stewardship, following congressional mandate, is not ntoti-
vated by profit-making policies. This is to be contrasted with, priiat6
industry, which must profit in order to survive.
D. What Price Policy?
The United-Sfates oil industry was neither born nor nurturpd in
frtgality. Reserves have been found for exploitation and,not for'pres-
ervation. Thus, owing to the sharp contrast of the double-edged desires
of the Government at once to preserve our domestic oil and to keep a
healthy oil economy, with the absolutely essential desire of the industry
to produce, vhether domestically or in foreign fields, the question of 'oil
imports assumes riddle-like dimensions.
It is obvious that the more imported oil we use domestically, the less
we shall be forced to use from our domestic reservoirs, the less will be
o This pamphlet, entitled HisToay OF NAVAL PETROLEUM 'AND OIL SHALE RE-
SERvES, and prepared by the Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, is un-
dated but contains factual data through Jan. x, 1959. The quotation is from page
'4. 31Id. at 15.
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available for enemy use against us in the event of war, and the more will
be left us for use in any future defense of our country. It is also good
planning not to depend upon oil from foreign sources in the event of
another total war. This indicates that our domestic reserves should be
in a healthy state of readiness. To accomplish this, absent total govern-
ment control or subsidization, the industry must make profits. Profits
are made, however, only through extraction of the reserves in quantity.
So, should one conclude that by using our reserves we are conserving
them? This ludicrous-sounding statement emphasizes that there are
premises in the picture from the present policy standpoint other than use
or nonuse of domestic supply.
It has been suggested that petroleum prices wield the big stick in
policy formation.32 The history of the present legislative basis for
niandatory import quotas, to be discussed later, gives testimony of the
wedding of national security to the economic welfare of the country.
This, in turn, is related to the health of the industry concerned.3 3 When
production is regulated by the states, as it is, and geared to market
demand, as it is, some results are apparent. Included among them are
that oil-producing states, following their self-interest, are going to main-
tain attractive price levels. Texas has a big share in this, producing one
out of seven barrels of all oil produced in the world, and two out of
Aive'barrels produced in this country. 4 For this husbandry, the industry
in Texas absorbs the market effects of those states that do not so regulate
-at a cost to Texas operators&3
That a policy that at once endeavors to satisfy protective pricing and
national defense would receive criticism, is inevitable. A sharp one is:36
There is a critical need for a coordinated, consistent policy toward this vital
industry. No such policy now exists: what we have instead is a patchwork of
interferences, concocted and administered piecemeal, pragmatically, under a
variety of influences, by a variety of governmental agencies, directed to a
variety of goals-none of them ever fully reconciled:
It does appear clear that from a long-term standpoint, goals of a healthy
domestic industry and conservation of domestic supply ,for a future use
cannot both be served by restriction of imports.
2DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note xo, at 2,18 (959).
"See U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 85th Cong. 2d Sess:, 1958, VOl. 2, p. 36o9.
* MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS AssocIATioN, TEXAS OIL AND GAS (1959).
3"DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note io, at z 8. See also What 8 Days Wil
Mean To Texani, Oil & Gas J., March 31, 1958, P.,47-
' Id. at 244.
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The divergence of opinion within the industry itself reveals that we
have yet to find some agreement as to the amount of allowable imports.
The majors and the independents agree upon the desirability of the
nation having a continued and reasonable oil supply. They also agree
that it is desirable to keep a sound domestic industry. Furthermore,
they agreethat some imports are needed. From that point on, opinions
differ. The independents stress that their production and their profits
must be such as will allow them to have incentive for further search.
They would have us drain all we can from our domestic reserves, even
though the operation of marginal wells will mean some additional cost
to the,.. stomer. On the other hand, the majors point out that domestic
oil is becoming increasingly more difficult and expensive to find and that
national security in the long run, depends just as much upon develop-
ment of foreign petroleum sources in order to make our domestic re-
serves last longer as it does upon a sound and secure domestic industry.
The majors also argue that they are not out to wreck the independents
for the very good reason that they desire to profit from their own
domestic affiliates.
Merit can be found in the arguments of both sides. The answer
lies somewhere in the areas above outlined. As will be seen later, the
federal government has arrived at an "in-between" area on policy re-
garding the amount of imports. This has resulted from an attempted
compromise and resolution of the interests involved. Such is not
uncommon in the formulation of congressional and executive policy.
It may well be that the problem, by its nature, will not be a long-term
one. With population and the demand for petroleum products on the
rise, in a few years, we may welcome all of the oil imports that we are
able to obtain. Moreover, if we are really serious about conservation
of our domestic supply (and this has been questioned37), some considera-
tion could be given to belt-tightening measures that would be calculated
to require everyone to share the expense of conservation. When, as by
restriction of imports, prices are maintained or increased, the consumer
is forced to bear the cost of protection, rather than share in the cost of
conservation 8
" DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note io, at 230.
3"We have paid $15,700,ooo,ooo (from 1953 to 1958) for farm subsidies, many
of the products of which are surplus to our needs. Life, Dec. 7, 1959, P. 138. If we
can afford this, perhaps we can afford a subsidy for nonproduction by the oil producer.





A. Renewed Concern Over Oil Imports
In 1944, the federal government took stock of the drain on'the
domestic oil reserves resulting from World War II and sought to par-
ticipate in the hastening of the development of the reserves in the
Middle East. American companies holding interests abroad refused
to sell stock to the United States and resisted attempts of the federal
government to get into the pipeline construction business." There were,
however, valid reasons for the*United States to seek, by whatever meas-
ures "most economic and least disturbing, an increase in the American-
controlled oil properties in the Middle East. ' 4 These reasons were
bluntly summarized by Mr. Feis:41
The first reason is found in the prospect that before long increased production
from those properties [Middle East] will be needed to meet the world de-
mand. The second is that those properties should be drawn upon more amply
than in the past in order to reduce the prospective drain on the reserves of this
hemisphere; for these reserves would be essential to the security of the
United States in the event of a future crisis.
International agreement for orderly development of and equal op-
portunity for world petroleum was considered, proceeded to the point
of having tentative endorsement by the United States industry, and was
reported upon favorably by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
in 1947.4- Industrial support of the proposed treaty waned,43 however,
probably because of fears of federal controls over the domestic industry.
The treaty was, therefore, never ratified.
future needs and allow us to trade our dollars for foreign irreplaceable resources in the
meantime.
Knowledge can certainly be imputed to all of those interested, including the federal
government, of factors such as encouragement of foreign investment and increase in
domestic refining capacity, which were likely to lead to domestic oversupply in peace-
time. This, in turn, was likely to lead to some demand for protection of the industry.
See DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, op. cit. supra note io, at 218, 210, 484.
"o ELY, op. cit. supra note x, at 659.
Feis, Order in Oil, 22 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 616, 6z6 (1944).
"Ibid. " ELY, op. cit. supra note ,, at 66t.
'nIn January 1946, the Independent Petroleum Association of America was still
endorsing the treaty. Oil & Gas J., Jan. 26, 1946, p. x5. With the resignation
of Ickes, Oil Gas J., Feb. 23, 1946, p. ioS, however, and the lifting of price controls,
Oil & Gas J., Aug. 3, 1946, P. 56, the industry enjoyed flexing its newly freed muscles
of independence. By Sept. 7, x946, the headline, Oil Men Feel Time Not Ripe For
Long-Range Foreign Policy, appeared in the Oil & Gas Journal at page 5z.
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By 1947, foreign petroleum operations were twenty per cent owned
by United States concerns, 44 and in the same year, the export-import
balance had shifted, making the United States a net importer. This
was occasioned by the unprecedented demand for petroleum products in
peacetime. One senator proposed an immediate embargo on oil exports
and a congressman declared :4 5
-[T]he progressively increasing demand for petroleum in the United States
and Europe, and the reliance which hitherto has been placed on greatly
expanded petroleum production in the Middle East in supplying this growing
demand in both continents, makes imperative a complete review of the degree
of confidence which we justifiably may have in imports and foreign reserves,
under changing political conditions.
So while there was both official and industrial concern over imports
at the midcentury, there was by no means unanimity of opinion concern-
ing the proper method of approach to the problem. Official thinking
was "obsessed" by alarm at the prospect of imminent shortage, 40 while
the industry was concerned with meeting increased demand for oil and
for protection.47
So with some wanting controls on exports, others wanting more
stringent import controls, and as many as nine federal agencies working
on national oil policy at one time,48 it is understandable that the report
of the National Petroleum Council, an advisory body to the Secretary of
the Interior, would attempt to gather all under its umbrella of an-
nounced policy:49
The nation's economic welfare and security requires a policy on petroleum
imports which will encourage exploration and development efforts in the
domestic industry and which will make available a maximum supply of
domestic oil to meet the needs of the nation.
The availability of petroleum from domestic fields produced under sound
conservation practices, together with other pertinent factors, provides the
means for determining if imports are desirable to supplement our oil supplies
on a basis which will be sound in terms of the national economy and in terms
of conservation.
The implementation of an import policy, therefore, should be flexible so
that adjustments may readily be made from time to time.
Imports in excess of our economic needs, after taking into account
,4omestic production in conformance with good conservation practices and
"Oil & Gas J., Dec. zo, 1947, p. 42. ' Oil & Gas J., Jan. 29, 1948, p. 138.
'6World Oil, July, 1949, p. 29. 47 Ibld.
,s Oil & Gas J., March 31, 1949, p. 55. "' CLARK, op. cit. stpra nott X, at 146.
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within the limits of maximum efficient rates of production, will retard domestid
exploration and development of new oil fields and the technologiqalprogrelss
in all branches of the industry which is essential, to the nation's .economic
welfare and security.
The headline, "Washington Hopes for Agreement on U.S. .Oil
Imports"5 0 is a most eloquent summation of the foregoing quotation--
The more responsible segment of the oil industry desired that the large
importers exercise temperance, having in mind the alternative-the
establishment of a quota system and the embryo of government control.
The larger importers exercised restraint in 1950 and cut down their
scheduled shipments for the year by a total of 7o,ooo barrels daily.5 '
B. Crisis Again Postpones-Then Rushes Action
Any further attempts to fuse the desires to 'keep our oil and us eit
too, into a workable long-term policy were temporarily suspenaed by
the Korean conflict-and later influeiced by the Suez crisis. Both events
tendered obvious lessons of history for those willing to accept. Korea
and Suez both demonstrated United States political mattirity and global
responsibility. Both demonstrated that our oil is available for use at
present when called upon. Suez was later to demonstrate that foreign
oil supply to the United States and friendly Europe is, at best, at the.
mercy of the changing complexion of cold war.
In January 1951, President Truman formed the Materials Policy
Commission. About eighteen months later, te. report of the Commis-
sion's study, described as "one of the most exhaustive studies ever made
of the problem of strategic materials for defeise,"5 was released. The
report was no prophecy of doom, but was a frank prediction of pro-
gressive inadequacy of petroleum to satisfy future domestic energy
requirements. The 1975 demand for petroleum is expected to be more
than double the 195o demand in the United States. In other parts 6f
the free world, the demand is expected to be three and four, times as
great as in 1950.
The tonic of new discoveries5 4 after Korea allowed the continuation
" World Oil, March 1950, p. 41: "Congressional subcommittees will continue -to
study the subject, but if the oil industry can meet the situation by voluntary action, it will
be a relief to many members and to some if not all administrative agencies."
rl Ibid.
i" FANNING, op. cit. supra note 7, at z74.
ra3 PRESIDENT'S MATERIALS POLICY COMM'N, RESOURCES FOR FREEDOIli: THE
OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY SOURCES (952).
"'FANNING, op. cit. sapra note 7, at 277. In May 1953, 2o new fields in Texas
Vol. i96i: X751
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of the study of the problem of oil imports in an atmosphere of delib-
erativeness rather than panic. So it was when President Eisenhower in
July 1954 appointed the Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources
to broadly examine all factors pertaining to United States energy and
resources "with the aim of strengthening the national defense, providing
orderly industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our ekpanding na-
tional economy and for any future emergency.' 55 With no immediate
emergency in sight, it is not surprising that one of the uppermost and
most insistent cries that occupied the Committee's mind was that pene-
trating rhetorical outburst made by E. 0. Thompson, Railroad Com-
missioner of Texas, who said, in hearings before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: "How can a Texas twenty barrel
allowable compete with a five thousand barrel well! "5' In addition,
the demands of the coal interests for import restrictions, the concern of
Venezuela and Canada, and the desire to build up Western Hemisphere
petroleum supply facilities and vital reserves thickened the porridge.
It is no wonder that Mr. Fanning declared, "There is no easy answer
to the import problem-no more so than there is to the entire question of
foreign oil and the Free World.""5T
were discovered, bringing the year's total to z66 in the state. This was an increase of
62 fields over the previous year.
G Ibid.
- CLARK, THE OIL CENTURY 244. (1958)
" FANNING, op. cit. supra note 7, at 278. One might wonder, in the consideration
of this entire question, why more emphasis is not placed on exports. An embargo on
exports, see text at note 45 supra, as well as restriction upon imports would aid in
the desired end of husbanding our reserves for domestic use. It is to be expected that
restrictions upon imports will reflect upon exports in that the less we import the easier it
will be for domestic producers to find profitable domestic markets. The record since
1958 bears this out, showing a decline in exports. In 1958, we exported 276,ooo barrels
-per day. The estimate for 196o is ±3o,ooo barrels per day. Oil & Gas J., Jan. 25,
!96o, p. 173. Most of this 196o amount, 224,ooo barrels per day, is expected to be in
products rather than crude. In addition, examination of the legislative basis for modern
regulation shows unmistakeably that the dominant forces in policy formation are pri-
marily concerned with protection of a healthy industry. This means encouragement of
discovery and production from domestic reserves. Disposition of the product, so en-
couraged, has been of secondary importance. Since national security depends upon
possession and use of these same reserves, it is difficult to reconcile how a healthy industry
will preserve national security. The reconciliation involves a gamble on timing and
total availability of reserves for the free world. If we seriously deplete our reserves in
order to keep the industry healthy until "X" day when domestic demand will overtake
supply, then we may win the battle of a healthy industry, to the detriment of our
national security. In the meantime, it appears that exports will, to the extent they




LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR MODERN REGULATION
A. Immediate Preludes to i955 Legislation
Soon after Congress met in 1955, the White House released the
report on energy supplies and resources policy. The CommitteePs had
concluded that in the interests of national security, imports of crude'
and residual oils should be kept in balance with the domestic production
of crude oil at the proportionate relationships that existed in 195e-
about ten per cent imports, ninety per cent domestic.
As a result of this Committee's study, the importing companies were
requested to restrict imports of petroleum to the United States on a
voluntary, individual basis in conformity with the policies enunciated by
the Committee. 0 The overriding concern of the Committee was "in-
adequate incentive for exploration and the discovery of new sources of
supply," which, it believed, would be detrimental to the future demands
of civilian use and national defenseY'
The immediate preludes to the passage of the i955 amendment to
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (Trade Agreements Extension
Act)0 2 were: (i) Senator Neely of West Virginia demanded an arbitrary
limitation of imports to ten per cent of demand;" (2) Standard Oil of
New Jersey indicated that it would hold its imports down, based on a
1954 ratio, and Gulf agreed to go along "so long as other importers do
likewise" 50 (3) the Independent Petroleum Association of America
" This is the cabinet committee that President Eisenhower appointed the previous
July. See text at note 55 supra.
"For text of this portion of the Energy and Resources Report, see Oil & Gas J.,
March 7, 1955, p. 85. This being a cabinet committee, agreement was reached as to
the broad policy on imports without any statement of opposition. This is not to say
that the way was clear to all or that there was general agreement. The hearings on
the Trade Agreements Extension Act developed the traditional "foreign policy versus"
domestic producers" conflict of opinions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) also came under sharp criticism.
"' In editorial comment on the report, World Oil, April 1955, p. 29 declared: "The
chief value of the reports lies in bringing out clearly the issue between those who believe"
that the national welfare is best served by preserving freedom of initiative to the indi-
vidual and holding necessary controls so far as possible to local levels and those who
favor the continuous extension of government control and management over industry."
"' Oil & Gas J., March 7, 1955, P. 85. Just the week before, in the Oil & Gas J.,
Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 82, 83, the headlines were, Import Estimates Rising and Imports
Hit All-Time High.
"Trade Agreements Extension Act, ch. 169 § 7, 69 Stat. 166 (1955), 19 U.S.C.§ 1364 (958).
"Oil & Gas J., March zi, 1955, p. 122. Id. at 123.
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(IPAA) backed the Neely amendment 65 (4) the State Department
opposed the Neely amendment, as the Department "saw no evidence
that either [coal or oil] has... suffered from imports... as to justify
the junking of the historic policy of permitting freedom of enter-
prise. . . . 3 ;i 6 (5) more all-time highs in imports were noted,"1 with
another trim in the Texas allowable 68 and (6) Congress, exercising
political wisdom, indicated a penchant to frame legislation in such a
fashion as to put the responsibility upon the executive branch to deter-
mine when and how much to restrict oil imports.6 9
B. 1955 Legislation
The amendment that was to become applied in the restriction of
petroleum imports was:70
(b) In order to further the policy and purpose of this section, whenever the
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has reason to believe that any
article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten
to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President, and if the
President agrees that there is reason for such belief, the President shall cause
an immediate investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis
of such investigation, and the report to him of the findings and recommenda-
tions made in connection therewith, the President finds that the article is
being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to
impair the national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of such article to a level that will not threaten to impair
the national security.
It should be noted that the words of the statute avoid the issue of how
much imports will threaten to impair the national security. Impairment
of national security is dearly the evil legislated against, but exactly what
gave rise to the evil was still unclear.
For those interested in strong protection, the evil was foreign com-
petition, "and [it was] adverse to the national interest, economy, se-
curity, and independence. ' 7 1  And, in spite of the language of the bill
Oil & Gas J., April 4, 1955, p. io6. Oil & Gas J., April x8, x955, p. ixt.
Oil & Gas J., April 25, 1955, p. 82. Mid. at 98.
Oil & Gas J., May z, 1955, p. 63.
"'Trade Agreements Extension Act, ch. 169 § 7, 69 Stat. x66 (x955), 19 U.s.c.
§ 1364 (~958).
" Statement of Senator George W. Malone of Nevada, U.S. Code Cong. & 4d.
News, 84 th Cong., ist Sess., 1955, vol. 2, p. 2xix. In spite of statements like this,
which tend to place all or most of the ills on the oil industry upon imports, one should
not be unmindful that the flattening of demand for petroleum is the real problem in the
[Vol. x961 : 175
quoted above, it was hotly declared:"
There is not one word guaranteeing any American market or supplier against
suffocation by foreign imports. There is not one word in this bill that offers
real safeguards from cutrate foreign competition to any American employed
in a domestic industry or whose dollars are invested in America....
This 1955 amendment was never invoked to require any restriction
upon imports. How much of a deterrent, if any, it was to those who
would break away from the "voluntary" import quota system, is a
matter for speculation. Administration of the import program, during
this phase of regulation will be treated in more detail later.
C. 1958 Modifications
The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1958 contains present
legislative authority for regulation of imports." Existing law is
strengthened by a requirement that no action shall be taken to decrease
the duty on an article if the President finds such reduction would
threaten to impair the national security.74
Under the 1955 amendment, the onus was upon the President
to cause an investigation if he were advised that some article was being
imported into the United States in quantities that threatened to impair
the national security. Now, the Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization (his title has been changed to "Director of the Office of
Civil and Defense Mobilization") does the investigation upon his own
motion or upon request of some other governmental agency. If, then, he
believes that the national security is being impaired, he is enjoined so to
advise the President. At that point, the President is required to take the
needed action, unless he finds that the imports of the article are not in
such quantities as would: threaten national security. The act does not say
whether the President would cause another investigation. Presumably
he could reject the advice of the Director without an investigation-but
this, being an impolitic move, is not likely to occur.
The addition of subsection (c) gives some criteria for the Director
and the President to follow, "without excluding other relevant fac-
United States industry. If imports were entirely shut off, there would still be too much
oil. World Petroleum, June 1960, p. 5.
"aU.S. Code Cong. & ld. News, 84 th Cong., ist Sess., 1955, vol. 2, p. 2115.1 72 Stat. 678, 19 U.S.C. § 1352a (1958). This modification was brought
about at the insistence by some that imports were still too high. See Oil & Gas Journals,
May 12, 1958, p. 81; May 19, 1958, p. 99, and May z6, i958, p. 59.
I 72 Stat. 678, 19 U.S.C. § 1352a (a) (1958).
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tors." 7" They are enjoined to give consideration to: (i) domestic pro-
duction needed for projected national defense requirements, (2) existing
and anticipated availabilities of resources essential to the national defense,
(3) growth requirements and stimulation necessary to assure such
growth, and (4.) how imports will affect the foregoing.
The Director and the President are also required to recognize the
close relation between economic welfare of the nation and national
security and to consider foreign competition versus: (i) economic wel-
fare of individual domestic industries, (2) substantial domestic unem-
ployment, (3) decrease in government revenues, (4) loss of skills or
investment, or (5) "other serious effects."7"
From the foregoing, a burden of highly-skilled, if not impossible,
omniscience has been placed upon the Director and President. The
record dearly shows that Congress, the fact-finder and policy-maker, has
not been able to synthesize all of the ingredients of the problem into
a workable formula. A part of Senate Report 1838 of July 15, 1958,
tacitly admits as much:77
A great deal has been said about the large numbers of workers dependent on
foreign trade but the committee was unable to uncover any information as to
the overall displacement of workers as a result of imports .... In the mean-
time, there is convincing evidence that in certain areas, in segments of vul-
nerable industries, and across the nation as a whole, excessive imports have
caused unemployment and otherwise weakened the economy which is in itself
a vital part of our national security....
Since this burden involves the task of continual resolution of relative
values, it is to be expected that the debate from interested sources will
require frequent re-evaluation of any action taken. So if a decision is
about to be reached to restrict imports to a certain percentage figure that
will permit more imports than before, it follows that those adversely
effected will make their position known. While this will undoubtedly
cause some illumination upon the path of policy, one might wonder
whether "national security" will become highly colored by definition
from the loudest and most insistent groups seeking a particular brand
of economic welfare.
In this respect, the individual views of Senator Douglas, in opposi-
7572 Stat. 678, 19 U.s.c. § 1352a (C) (1958).
7' Ibid. The remaining added subsections relate to publication of reports and reports
to Congress.
7 U.S. Code Cong. & 4d. News, 85th Cong., zd Sess., 1958, vol. 2, P. 3620.
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tion to this so called "National Security Amendment," are of interest.s
He foresaw the national security amendment as subject to abuse in order
for special tariff treatment.
He saw in the amendment an "implicit syllogism," which is:
(I) The economic welfare of the country affects national security.
(2) Any industry that is injured by imports weakens the economic
welfare of the country.
(3) Therefore, injury to a domestic firm or product, or unemploy-
ment, or a decrease in government revenues, loss of skills or
investment, affects the national security.
Senator Douglas listed some industries that have sought escape-clause
relief in the past (special tariff protection), and which he believed could
now seek relief as national security industries. He listed about fifty
items, 79 among them: spring clothespins, glace cherries, pregnant mares
urine, rosaries, red fescue seed, hatter's fur, ferrocerium (lighter flints),
watches, and bicycles. In short, he was opposed to expansion of pro-
tection. Protection, however, is precious to those who have it and who
want more of it.80
IV
VOLUNTARY PHASE OF REGULATION
A. Districts for Administration
In order to deal with the events leading to the establishment of the
voluntary phase of regulation, coordination districts have been set up.
These districts are now divided, for the purposes of administration, into
two categories. These are Districts I-IV and District V. The former
districts (composed of all the states, with the exceptions of the West
Coast states, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska, and Hawaii), have a substantial
production capacity that is in excess of actual production. This is largely
7"Id. at 3630. "RId. at 3631.
"°Dallas Morning News, Dec. 5, 1959, § i, p. 8, col. 4 reported that Senator
Yarborough of Texas declared: "Congress should act to protect our valuable domestic
petroleum industry, its employees and our federal, state and local governments .... We
need a stronger basis for the control of oil imports than this." [referring to the
mandatory quota system].
Incidentally, the Joint Committee for American-Flag Tankers and the Committee of
American Tanker Owners, Inc., now want protection from the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization. Their desire is for a regulation requiring that 50% of all oil imports be
carried in American-flag tankers. The tanker interests' argument is that without such
protection, they could not compbte with foreign tankers and that such a result adversely
affects national security. Oil & Gas J., Jan. '25, i96o, p. 130.
Vol. ig6i : 175] OIL IMPORTS
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Secause of the control of state regulatory commissions.8 ' On the other
hand, District V, which is composed largely of California oil fields, does
not have production control as in Districts I-IV. Production is de-
dining steadily and imports are necessary to meet demands. Further-
more, the separation of these two categories is such that transportation
from Districts I-IV to District V is difficult. This situation was im-
proved in 1958 by additional pipeline capacity from Texas and Okla-
homa to the West Coast.
B. Events Leading to Voluntary Quota System
The policy of voluntary restriction worked reasonably well until
about the middle of 1956.2 This voluntary restriction was the type
wherein the importing companies were requested to keep their crude
imports within the 1954 production ratio. This ratio was slightly in
excess of ten per cent." The Special Committee to Investigate Crude
Oil Imports (a blue-ribbon committee composed of the Secretaries of
the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Interior, Labor, and
Commerce) found, however, on the basis of schedules submitted to the
Office of Defense Mobilization, that a sharp rise in imports was sched-
uled for the last half of 1956 and 1957. The following table, taken
from the Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Im-
ports, July 29, 1957, reveals the imports by categorized districts and
the progression of the percentage ratios of imports to production:
It will be seen from the foregoing table that imports increased only
slightly in Districts I-IV in I955 and the first half of 1956. This
brought the ratio up to 11.9 per cent. There was a sharp rise in the third
quarter of i956 to 13.5 per cent. The drop in the fourth quarter may
be attributed to Suez."4 After Suez opened, the schedules filed rose,
as may be seen, to sixteen per cent.
The rise of imports and planned imports in District V was even
more pronounced, going from 5.2 per cent to a projected 29.8 per cent
for the second half of 1957.
The Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., was, in June
1956, reflecting the country's diplomatic viewpoint in dedaring that
discriminatory measures, quotas, and governmental regulation, were




1The ratio for all imported petroleum products was in excess of 16%.
" SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (July 9,
1957).
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PERCENTAGE RATIO OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTS TO UNITED STATES
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS DAILY)
1st 3rd 4th 2nd
half quarter quarter half
1954 1955 1956 1956 1956 1957
Districts I-IV
Imports .................... 605 689 735 830 718 971'
Production ................. 5367 5835 6199 6155 6212 60792
Percentage Ratio ............ 11.3 11.8 11.9 13.5 11.6 16.0
District V
Imports .................... 51 93 153 212 198 275'
Production ................. 975 972 967 959 949 9231
Percentage Ratio ............ 5.2 9.6 15.8 22.1 20.9 29.8
Total United States
Imports .................... 656 782 888 1042 916 1246'
United States Production .... 6342 6807 7166 7114 7161 70022
Percentage Ratio ............ 10.34 11.5 12.4 14.7 12.8 17.8
1 The importing companies in filing reports with the Office of Defense Mobilization estimated that their imports into
District V for this period would he 296,000 barrels per day. There is reason to believe, however, that these imports will not
exceed 275,000 barrels per day and, as a result, this figure is being used throughout the report.
2Estimated, Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior.
not favored by the administration. 5 Quotas were described as placing
"shackles on an industry whose dynamic qualities should be fostered
rather than hampered." Mr. Hoover also warned that quotas would
ultimately lead to governmental price fixing and further controls.8 6
Mr. Hoover received a hot rejoinder, reflecting clearly that all were
not so frightened of government control.8 7 The IPAA, indeed, asked
for control. On August 7th, they asked that action be taken under the
portion of the 1955 Trade Agreements Extension Act quoted above."8
After receiving the request of the IPAA, the Director of Defense
Mobilization caused a public hearing to be held from October 22-24,
1956.11 As the hearings were held, imports were showing gains.90 No
action was taken immediately, but the Director declared that, but for
the Suez crisis, he would have no course but to make a certification under
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 that projected import
plans constituted a threat to national security.
" CLARK, op. cit. supra note I, at 247. Clark's source is from a speech delivered
at the 1956 midyear meeting of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, held in Dallas,
Texas.8 Ibid.
7 Id. at 248. Mr. Warwick M. Downing, Colorado's representative at the meeting
declared "Free enterprise has never meant that business should be free of Governmental
control .... 1
es See text at note 70.
" SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTs, REPORT (July 29,
1957).
so Oil & Gas J., Oct. 29, x956, p. 77-
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i. Considerations of the Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil
Imports
The facts of rising imports are recorded in the above table. The
Committee considered that there was a direct relationship between the
nation's security and available sources of energy. Not seeing any im-
mediate replacement for oil and gas, which account for two-thirds of
consumed energy in the United States,' available supplies were con-
sidered important. The crux of the Committee's rationale was that a
limitation of imports will tend to insure a "proper balance ' 92 between
imports and domestic production.
The Committee rejected a plan of importing foreign crude oil into
the United States and storing it within completed fields or elsewhere
as being too costly and as presenting too many physical problems.
Also rejected was a course of action that would enlarge government
participation in exploring for oil reserves, which would be shut in as
reserves. This, too, was considered too costly and "contrary to the
principles of free enterprise which characterize American industry.""
Outright encouragement of increased imports in order to conserve
domestic reserves was rejected as unsound. It was believed that this
would: (i) result in a flow of foreign oil that was in excess of the
quantities needed to supplement domestic supply; (2) discourage and
decrease domestic productioni (3) cause a marked decline in domestic
exploration and development; and (4) because of the time lag between
exploration and production, leave the nation years away from the attain-
ment of any emergency supply of fuel.
The Committee declared that it had considered the foreign policy
aspects of limiting petroleum imports as well as the interests of domestic
consumers. The impact of restricted imports on the latter group was
rationalized by declaring that excessive reliance on the low-cost im-
ported oil may put the consumer in a long-term vulnerability of facing
a shortage and possible unavailability.
2. Recommendations
In view of the foregoing, it was recommended, commencing the last
half of 1957 and the first half of 1958, that all large importing com-
panies that were importing into Districts I-IV cut back imports to ten
9 N.Y. Times, May 31, 1959, § II, p. x3 M, col. I.




per cent below their average for the years 1954, 1955, and 1956. Small
importers (those who had imported less than 2o,ooo barrels per day in
1954) were not asked for percentage cuts, but were requested to import
as per submitted schedule, and in any case, not to exceed iO2,OO barrels
per day over their 1956 imports.9 4
No requested restrictions were recommended for District V at this
time, as the level of imports was considered to be within the difference
-between market demand and domestic production. It was planned,
however, to review the District V situation in about six months and the
entire situation every year, at least.
The over-all requested restrictions were calculated to maintain a ratio
between imports and domestic production of about twelve per cent, or
between imports and domestic demand of about 9.6 per cent.
Provision was made for fitting new importers into the total scheme.
It was recognized that the plan might be circumvented by the transfer
of allotments, oil sale and product purchase agreements, and the im-
portation of products rather than crude, so the Office of Defense Mobili-
zation was enjoined to observe the situation. It was recommended
finally that the Department of the Interior, under policy guidance from
the Office of Defense Mobilization, administer the plan.
The foregoing recommendations were put into effect on July 29,
I957.°9 Secretary of the Interior Fred A. Seaton requested and obtained
the services of Captain Matthew V. Carson, Jr., U.S.N., to administer
the program."
C. The System of Control
As has been seen above, the goal of restriction based on the July 29,
1957, recommendations (which were adopted by the President on the
same day) was not to roll back imports to a figure pegged on the 1954
:'Ibid.
0' White House Memorandum for Secretary of the Interior and Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization,, July z9, 1957. It is interesting that this plan would be put
into effect when the analysis of the problem and the answer to it was slanted differently
by the English trade newspaper, Petroleum Press Service. In an article titled, Lagging
U.S. Reserves, it was pointed out that "merely to maintain the present ratio between
United States domestic production and reserves, and between production and imports
in the period up to 1965, for example, would require an average annual rate of gross
additions to proved reserves about 5o% higher than in recent years." 24 PETROLEUM
PRESS SERVICE 169 (957). It was generally concluded that rising imports would
be needed.




imports, but to take into the account all imports for the years 1954, 955,
and 1956 in fixing the import quota. The recommendations represent
an important step in the definition of the proper balance between im-
ports and domestic security and in the definition of the point where im-
ports begin to effect national security. A judgment was reached that
17.8 per cent of imports to crude oil production (in all districts) was
too much in the way of imports. This was to serve as a starting point
and as precedent for the same type of administrative judgments that
were to be made when the program became mandatory. Although what
transpired during the voluntary system of control will not be legally
binding upon what will transpire under the mandatory program, the
voluntary system of control afforded a good opportunity to ascertain
what was reasonable in the way of restriction. That is to say, if con-
trols were reasonable enough to beget cooperation under a voluntary
program, the same area of reasonability, with its defined periphery,
would likely be "reasonable" in a legal sense in the administration of a
mandatory program.
Based upon the evidence of records and schedules and submitted by
the established importers, allowed imports for each, expressed in
thousands of barrels daily and calculated upon the formula that was
applicable to Districts I-IV, were set up. For example, Sinclair was
found to have a three-year average of 69,oo barrels per day. The im-
ports per formula were thus 69.1 minus 6.9, or 62,2oo barrels per day.
The new and small importers were treated in the manner recom-
mended. 7
No sanctions were provided for refusal to comply with the allowed
imports. The desire of the industry to stay as free as possible from
control, plus whatever patriotic suasion was generated by the knowledge
that imports had been found to pose a threat to national security, were
expected to achieve cooperation. Lacking cooperation, the program
would never have gained headway.
At the outset, provision was made to hear appeals of those companies
that claimed inequitable treatment, and Captain Carson received initial
encouraging information from most companies, indicating their willing-
ness to participate. 9
Forms, the sine qua non of the regulators and the bane of the regu-
" See text at note 94 supra. 'a Oil & Gas J., Aug. g, 1957) P. 97.
" Oil & Gas J., Aug. xz, 1957, p. 71. Sun Oil Company said flatly that it was
afraid of anti-trust laws and would not comply. Others failed to state specifically what
they intended to import.
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lated, were prepared for obtaining records of each company's actual
monthly imports and planned imports. Effective April 1958, certificates
of compliance were issued to importing firms. An importing firm was
not in compliance if it exceeded its established allocation in any three
consecutive months.
Even though the program was from the outset called "voluntary,"
it was realized by all concerned that the overtones of compulsion were
present. For instance, all of the results of the program were to. be
published, and a "violator" would thereby be made known to the public.
Further, it was realized that statutory machinery was available to be
called in to assist in requiring instead of requesting, by the same agency
that was then requesting. The IPAA had no illusions about the pro-
gram being completely voluntary.100
D. Operation and Success of the Program
i. Regulation for District V
It will be recalled that the recommendations of the first report of Q
the Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports called for no
restrictive action in District V. However, this Committee reappraised
the situation as they indicated they would, in December, 1957-°'
They found that the programmed imports for the first half of 1958
were 348,80o barrels per day. This was upon the basis of information
submitted to the Administrator, Captain Carson. It was also found that
the deficit between production and estimated demand was approximately
22o,ooo barrels per day. This required a reduction of thirty-seven per
cent of programmed imports. It was recommended, as before with
Districts I-IV, that the cuts be made on a percentage ratio of previous
imports. For the majors in District V, this amounted to fifteen per cent
of the 1956-57 daily average. The small and new importers were also
given special treatment in District V.
The Office of Defense Mobilization and Department of Interior
were cautioned to watch for indirect noncompliances with the recom-
mended formulae. The President directed all the recommended action
to be placed into effect.'
100 Oil & Gas J., Aug. 12, 1957, p. 74- See also Oil & Gas J., July 22, 1957, p. 47,
wherein it was stated that the voluntary program would be "backed up by the gun of
public opinion and the threat of government enforced quotas ...21
.0 SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (Dec. xz,
1957) (no pagination).
'"White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior and the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Dec. 12, 1957.
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2. Special Committee Report of March 24, 1958103
This report was a review of the voluntary plan to date and was again
concerned with Districts I-IV. The Committee found that all but three
"substantial importers" had complied with the voluntary program, and
that in a number of instances, companies did not import the full amount
of their assigned quotas.104
Keeping of the voluntary program was recommended. It was noted
that the industry had not yet bounced back from the post Suez let-
down. The original twelve per cent ratio of imports to production was
kept, with a resulting eight per cent required cut in current imports. 05
The Committee noted that it had anticipated that new importers
could be accommodated without curtailing the established importers.
This was because of an expected increasing rate of production. Pro-
duction having declined, it was announced that established importers
would have to "move over" to provide for these newcomers. 100
As a measure to strengthen the voluntary program, it was recom-
mended that the provisions of the Buy American Act' 07 be incorporated
in the procurement contracts of all agencies of the government pur-
chasing petroleum under contract.'08 This, then, was a tacit admission
that some help was needed to accomplish the aim of restricted imports.
The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the
President on March 25, 1958. " '
The program was undergoing obvious stress, but had managed to
hold together. Congress was in session, and some members wanted
stronger import controls." 0  Further, the industry was not as healthy
economically as had been expected."'
1o' SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, SUPPLEMENTAL RE-
PORT (March 24, 1958).
'"Id. at i. ... Oil & Gas J., March 31, 1956, p. So.
.o SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, SUPPLEMENTAL RE-
POR:T 3 (March 24, 1958).
1
0
T Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (I933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ xoa-d
0g58).
10. This was implemented by Executive Order No. 10761, 23 Fed. Reg. zo6,
(1958). Anyone selling petroleum products to any agency of the United States had
to agree to the following provision: "The contractor agrees that during the contract
period he will comply in all respects with the Voluntary Oil Import Program."
109 White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, March zS, t958.
For the tabulated effect of the recommendations as they pertained to each gompany, see
Oil & Gas J., March 31, 1958, p. 51.
.10 Oil & Gas J., May 5, 1958, P- 75.
... E.g., U.S. Oil Makes Heavy Gointg, 25 PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE 84 (1958):
"The essence of U.S. producers' present difficulties lies in the extent to which they have
[Vol. i96i: t7S
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3. Nine Months' Appraisal
The dual headlines of "Tough Import Plan Fading in Congress '" 2
and "Voluntary Import Plan 97% Effective" 18 had obvious kinship.
That is to say, the success of the voluntary program was a large factor in
the avoidance of congressionally fixed, arbitrary, and mandatory quotas.
This, coupled with probable congressional unwillingness to tackle a
factually and politically tough problem resulted in the 1958 legislation
that put the burden on the Executive to do the restricting.114
The Administrator, Captain Carson, was apparently pleased with
the ninety-seven per cent effectiveness of the program and complimented
the complying companies for their "business statesmanship." Two of
the three leading companies that had failed previously to comply with
the program appeared ready to stay within the quotas set by the
formula. Only one persisted in the disregard of quotas. This im-
porter, Eastern States Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, had con-
tracted for more foreign oil than its officers had requested quotas for.
Apparently being unable to replace a lost Japanese sales outlet, the
Company was caught with an excess of imports. While trying to
arrange for a market, the Company put its excess in bonded storage in
accordance with the Customs rules. When it found itself in non-
compliance with the program (after it had no more storage available),
the Company also found itself in the position of losing two government
contracts and losing future government contracts because of the Presi-
dent's Executive Order that brought the Buy American Act in to support
the voluntary oil import program." 5 The Company, unsuccessful in its
attempts to have the quota revised through the appeals procedure to
the Administrator, attacked the legality of Executive Order 10761 of
March 27, 1958, as well as the propriety of the action of the Admin-
istrator in refusing a revised quota. The District Court first dismissed
Eastern's motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the Executive
Order was lawful both under the Buy American Act and under the
Government's power to buy from whomever it pleased." 6 The Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed, as the tendered issue
of the arbitrary action in the implementation of the Voluntary Oil
over-extended their productive capacity, some of which though profitable, is quite un-
economic when measured against imports."
. Oil & Gas J., May 5, z958, p. 74. '" Id. at 75-
' See text at page 19o supra. " See text at notes 107, 1o8 supra.
.. Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Corp., v. Seaton, x63 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C.
1958).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Import Program should have been considered. This was considered
later,117 and the Administrator's refusal was specifically found to be not
s~o arbitrary as to warrant a preliminary injunction against the Govern-
ment to restrain cancellation of government procurement contracts.
While a hardship undoubtedly existed, the Administrator had apparent-
ly deter mined that such had arisen as a result of the Company's business
judgment and private contractual difficulties. Upon a short review of
the facis of the case, the court found that there was "ample evidence"
to sustain the Administrator.
It is difficult to see how the action of the Administrator could have
been otherwise and also consistent with a fair policy toward all im-
porters. If internal difficulties of an importing company were to serve
as a springboard for preferential treatment, an equitable allocation
among all would soon be a thing of the past. The judgment of the
court is, therefore, considered sound. In reaching such a conclusion,
one must not be unmindful of the very real hardship that must have
been placed upon Eastern, which endeavored, apparently as long as it
could (and consistently with its contractual arrangements), to comply
with the program. Hardship, however, is not unusually a predicate of
regulation, as regulation must strike a balance to achieve its goal. The
direct effect of the striking of the balance is to curtail freedom of those
regulated.
4. Mid z958 Reports by Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oit
Imports
By June 1958, petroleum products importations in Districts I-IV
were giving the Special Committee some concern. They had found
that while crude importation was being kept within tolerable limits, the
voluntary import program was being threatened by the importation of
products. As a consequence, it was recommended that the Admin-
istrator commence a voluntary system to govern the importation of
unfinished gasoline and other unfinished oil." 8  At that time, it was
concluded that residual fuel oil and miscellaneous product imports did
not constitute a threat to the voluntary program, but the Director of
the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Administrator were asked
""Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Corp., v. Seaton, x6s F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C.
1958). For a related case concerning Eastern's attempt to test taxation statute on oil
imports, see Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, z65 F.zd 593 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
... SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTs, REPORT (June 4,
1958). These recommendations were approved by White House Memorandum for the
Secretary of the Interior, June 4, 1958.
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to keep the situation with respect to petroleum products under constant
review.119
With respect to District V, the June 3o report of the Special Com-
mittee found that the imports into this District had been less than the
limit set. It, therefore, recommended that the 22i,ioo barrels per day
ceiling remain and that the allocation for new importers and increases
granted be within that over-all figure. These recommendations were
approved by the President on July 1, 1958.120
V
VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY-IN TRANSIT
An objective appraisal of a program wherein the importers "vol-
untarily" tightened their import belts in order to bring about a healthy
result to the economy and in furtherance of national security must in-
clude the adjective "successful." It was a success to get the program
operating at all. The ninety-seven per cent effectiveness figure could
not, of course, have been attained without excellent cooperation of the
industry.
With the aid of hindsight, it can now be seen that as the program's
success was growing, pressures were building that would lead to a
logical and short step to further control as 1959 approached.
Districts I-IV importers were multiplying and claiming a share of
the total "allowable" barrels per day imports to that area. This meant
that the major importers were having to reduce their quotas to make
room.' 2' How long the majors would be willing to absorb the resolu-
tion of inequities of small importers, at the formers' expense, was a
delicate question. 2- Add to this circumstance the combination of many
others, and the seams of the voluntary program would be expected to
receive strain and stress, if not to burst. Items:
(i) Eastern was unhappy (to the point of litigation) with even the
voluntary program.
(2) The midyear 1958 Oil and Gas Journal report showed: (a)
refinery runs had to be cut in order to reduce product surplus-runs
119 Id. at 3.
120 White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, July x, 1958.
12' Oil & Gas J., June 23, 1958, p. 8o.
1'"Ibid. The words of DE CHA EAu & KAHN, op. cit. supra note io, at 248, be-
come prophetic here: "Since this method of control can only become increasingly burden-
some and arbitrary as the number of firms in possession or potential possession of foreign
oil grows, quotas must be regarded as no better than a stop-gap measure."
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'barely exceeded 1955's;123 (b) production for first half (1958) was over
1,ooo,ooo barrels per day lower than for the comparable period in the
previous year; 124 (c) free foreign production exceeded United States
output by more than 2,ooo,ooo barrels per day 12 5 (d) imports of
products other than residual fuel gained i 19 per cent over the previous
year; 126 and (e) about fifty newcomers (importers) were looking for
quotas.
27
(3) With oil just beginning to show a climb out of the doldrums
indicated above,128 pressure for protection of domestic industry and
prices was a predictable sequel.
As the year 1958 went on, requests for import quotas kept coming
in.' 29  The total requested daily boosts in imports (Districts I-IV)
otaled approximately i,oooooo barrels per day. This is a large in-
crease, considering that the daily quota for those districts was, at that
time, 713,ioo barrels per day.' 30 Coal men and independents were
concerned about the rise in imports of refined products and wanted
curbs. 3' August and September imports of crude and unfinished oils
were above quota; Eastern States, having lost its court battle, was im-
porting almost four .times its quota; and a new plan, setting quotas on
the basis of historical imports combined with refinery runs was being
considered.' 2 As 1958 drew to a dose, a coal state congressman, James
E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania, announced plans to have Congress set
.quotas, declared that Congress never should have thrust the job of regu-
lating imports upon the Executive, and was reported as favoring a cut-
back in residual imports in order to bring "new hope" to coal miners.?'
That a revamping of the voluntary import program was in all
likelihood to come was verified by an interim repoft pf the Special Com-
mittee to Investigate 'Oil Imports, on December 22, 1958."3 The
tommittee reported that it.was engaging in an intensive review of the
program and was going to present certain recommendations for change.
iPending submission of those recommendations, the Committee desired
that importers be advised that no changes would be made through
February 28, 1959, in' crude 6il allocatidns, and that they also be re-
.
2 Oil & Gas J., July as, 1958, p. 135. '1Id. at 138.
... Oil & Gas J., June Z3, 1958, p. x4o. 120 Id. at 14z.
" Id. at 1o5. ' I*155d. at zoo.
129 Import Quota Bids Mushroom, Oil & Gas J., Aug. 11, 1958, p. 78.
.. Ibid. - Oil & Gas J., Aug. x8, 1958, p. zo5.
... Oil & Gas J., Nov. 3, 1958, P. 48. ""3 Oil & Gas J., Dec. z9, 1958, p. 73.
"' Approved by White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior, Dec.
22, 1958.
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quested to limit their importation of unfinished gasoline and other un-finished oils to the present allocations.
VI
MANDATORY PHASE OF REGULATION
A. Machinery of Implementing Mandatory Phase
In accordance with the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958,'
the actions of the Special Committee, the Director of the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the President combined to implement this new phase of
regulation. It should be recalled that the Act itself does not require
mandatory controls, but that such controls could be imposed by the
will of the President.13
B. Actions Taken
At the instance of the Special Committee, the Secretary of State
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that the Director of the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, pursuant to the Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act, make an appropriate investigation to determine
the effects on the national security of imports of crude oil and its deriva-
tives and products.137
This investigation was undertaken by the Director on January 28,
1959."'8 The Director reviewed the program and concluded that not-
withstanding the effectiveness of the voluntary limitation plan, the
quantities and circumstances of oil imports had not beei stabilized. With
particular mention of crude oil derivatives and products, it was cautiously
tendered that there had been a circumvention of the limitation program.
It was opined that imports had been a major contributing factor to the
declihe in drilling operations. The voluntary program was given credit
'for curtailing what would have been importation in drastic quantities.
World oversupply was noted with a statement that without control,
there would be substantial economic incentives to increase imports. In
a SUPplemental memorandum, the Director noted that for the period
1954 to r958, the domestic crude oil reserves were increasing only
". See text at page 189.
15072 Stat. 678, 19 U.S.C. § 1352a (b) (.958).
.',SPECjAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (March 6,
1959).
13 Director of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Memorandum. for the President,
Feb. 27, 1959.
Vol. x961: 175] OIL IMPORTS
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
2.8 per cent,139 while demand for petroleum products increased 15.5
per cent. This indicated to him that an incentive for exploration was
needed. The determination was reached that crude oil and the prin-
cipal crude oil derivatives and products were being imported in such
quantities and under circumstances that threatened to impair the national
security.
With the Director's recommendations in hand, the Special Commit-
tee recommended on March 6, 1959 that the Voluntary Oil Import
Program be replaced by a mandatory program that would (i) limit
imports, and (2) distribute allocations among companies in a "fair and
equitable manner."' 140 Specific reasons for the need of a mandatory
program were: (a) excessive imports by companies that had not com-
plied with the Voluntary Program, (b) a threat to the success of the
Voluntary Program because of increased importation of unfinished oils
and products, (c) the likelihood of increased noncompliance among
companies now having allocations when they were asked to cut back im-
ports voluntarily in order to provide allocations for newcomers to the
program, and (d) the impossibility of working out a desirable and
legally permissible revision of the Voluntary Program acceptable to the
Committee.
i. Recommended control
The Committee then recommended specifics for the mandatory pro-
gram.' 4 ' It listed the derivatives that should be controlled as well as
crude oil. Districts I-IV imports were to be related to demand, and
the limitation was to be about nine per cent of total demand in such
districts. Within that maximum limit, imports of finished products were
not to exceed the 1957 level. In District V, the imports were to be
sufficient to make up the difference between domestic production and
demand, again with derivatives and residual oil to be used as fuel to be
topped at the 1957 level. In general, these amounts were to be sub-
ject to change by the Secretary of the Interior in order to meet mini-
mum requirements of refiners and to meet the over-all objectives of the
program as they pertained to the imports of residual fuel oil to be used
as fuel in District I-IV.
In addition, Puerto Rican imports were to be watched. The Secre-
... Director of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Supplemental Memorandum for the
President, March 4, 1959.




Vol. igs6: 75 ] OIL IMPORTS 205
tary of the Interior was to restrict allocations'to those having refinery
capacity in the United States. Exchanges of foreign for domestic crude
and products were to be made only when advance authorization was
granted by the Secretary. Original allocations were to be made to those
companies that imported in 1957 and in the amounts imported by them
during such period. Controls were to become effective, at the latest, on
April I, 1959, and the Secretary of the Interior was to review alloca-
tions every six months. It was also recommended that the Director and
the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and
Labor keep a dose surveillance of imports that might indicate the need
for further presidential action. An appeal board was recommended
that was to be comprised of a representative from the Departments of
the Interior, Defense, and Commerce, which could alleviate hardship
or error or other special circumstances, but within the limits of the
maximum level of imports.
C. Executive Proclamation 3279 of March io, 1959142
This proclamation of March io, 1959 gave presidential blessing
to a mandatory program. The recommendations of the Special Commit-
tee, with more detail and definition, were adopted. The Secretary of the
Interior was authorized to issue regulations to implement the program.
Such regulations were to provide for the revocation or suspension by the
Secretary of any allocation or license on grounds relating to the national
security, or for the violation of the terms of the proclamation or any
regulation or license, issued pursuant to the proclamation.
The executive order 43 providing for the Buy American phase of the
voluntary program, no longer needed, was revoked, and the Special
Committee was discharged.
As an example of how an inarticulate predicate of a recommendation
can easily become a firm criterion of regulation, recall that the OCDM
and the Cabinet secretaries were, by the Special Committee's recom-
mendation, to keep a constant surveillance of imports, etc. When that
recommendation was presented for the President's pen and signed, it
had grown to include:...
In the event prices of crude oil or its products of derivatives should be increased
after the effective date . . .such surveillance shall include a determination of
22 2 4 Fed. Reg. 1781 0959). 2"' 23 Fed. Reg. 2o67 (x958).
."Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, § 6(a), z4 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959). (Em-
phasis added.) It is hazarded that this was included by work of the staff. No other
explanation for its inclusion has been found.
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whether -such increase or increases are necessary to accompligh the national
security objectives....
The President's statement in issuing the proclamation noted his
regret in having to make the system mandatory because of the unwilling-
ness of a few to join in the voluntary program. Actually it was a rather
painless step to take, as it would serve to equalize responsibility among
all and would benefit those who had been previously complying by a
more equitable division of quotas.
D. The Shape of Administration
The Oil Import Regulation 40 implementing the presidential procla-
mation was issued soon after (March 13, 1959) by the Secretary of
the Interior. Its pattern of allocation was as recommended and dis-
cussed above. Allocations were made according to past refinery inputs
and past imports, in an effort more equitably to distribute the alloca-
tions. 140 --Sections nineteen and twenty contain the teeth of control as
they relate to criminal penalties and revocation or suspensions of licenses.
Clarifications were soon made with' respect to unfinished oil importa-
tion 47 and proper method of exchanges (oil for oil only-not oil for
money or for credit).41s Also, the Oil Import Appeals Board was
authorized to make its own procedural rules;149 proclamation number
3279 was modified;' 50 and notice of miscellaneous amendments was
given on May 28, 1959.151 From this emanated the June 6, 1959 "Oil
Import Regulation i [Revision I]. )"152
The launching of the mandatory phase of the program was perhaps
made more propitious by a rising domestic demand. 53 The first half
of 1959 demand was 6.4 higher than the first half of 1958 demand.
It was thus possible to launch the mandatory program with a 30,000
"24 24. Fed. Reg. 1907 (1959). .. Id. at §§ so and ii.
147 z4 Fed. Reg. 2361 (1959). 1&8 Ibid.
249 24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1959).
.. Ibid. By this, products entering the U.S. by pipelines or overland means were
exempted from restriction. This was primarily for the mutual benefit of District V and
Canada. The President announced on April 30 that this was in the interests of joint
defense of the hemisphere and that Venezuela and other Western Hemisphere countries
had not been forgotten. Press release by James Hagerty, Press Secretary to the Presi-
-dent, April 30, 1959.
151 24 Fed. Reg. 4379 (x959).
252 24 Fed. Reg. 4654 (1959). This was amended on Aug. 14, x959 by revising
the' definition of refinery inputs to conform to Presidential Proclamation No. 329o
§-(C), 24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1959).
.. Mid-Year Report, Oil & Gas J., June 27, 1958, p. 132.
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barrels per day increase, making the July i to December 31, 1959
allowable at 1,450,362 barrels per day."" Mandatory controls were no
panaceas for old plagues, however. By the end of June, eighty-one
petitions for revisions in import quotas had been filed.'55 This amounted
to about one-third of the importers. For those who were not in accord
with the philosophy of quotas, as compared to some other method of
control, a mandatory program vis-.-vis a voluntary one, offered no
succor."'
6
Eastern States Petroleum and Chemical Corporation was still not
satisfied with its particular quota and again sought the assistance of a
federal court. 5 7 In two cases' 58 decided by the United States District
Court for the Southern District- of Texas on September I8, 1959,
plaintiffs sought declaratory judgments and injunctions against the
Collector of Customs to restrain him from enforcing the mandatory pro-
gram. Texas-American, a newcomer to refining, had no history of
refinery input. Texas-American, although not unaware of the forth-
coming restrictions in 1959, entered into a contract to buy a special type
of Venezuelan crude, called Bachaquero crude, for its asphalt, plant.
The regulation, when it came out, would only permit the granting of
allocations to those with a history of refinery inputs. Claiming hard-
ship, Texas-American asked for a quota in order that it might fulfill its
contract to purchase the Bachaquero oil. The quota was refused on the
ground that there was no history of refinery inputs. While the action
was brought to test, the validity of the administrative ruling denying a
license and an allocation was questioned, and the holding of the case was
that the Administrator and the Appeals Board were indispensable
parties. Although the following are in the nature of dicta, the court,
in discussing the merits of the case, declared that: (i) the President had
not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the regulations to be
made; (2) the Administrator correctly construed the regulations; and
(3) no one had any vested right.to carry on foreign commerce and that
governmental regulation of foreign commerce, if based upon congres-
sional policy, was not invalid, even if it resulted in the regrettable conse-
quence of forcing a company or an industry out of business.
... Oil & Gas J., June 15, 1959, p. 61. " Oil & Gas J., July 6, 1959, p. 68.
...DE CHAZEAU & KAHN, Op. cit. supra'note so, at 253 (1959): "Imposition of
compulsory quota controls in-March 1959 represented a more forthright course of action5
but it makes no more economic sense than the policy it supplanted."
1 Oil & Gas J., June 15, 1959, p. 63.
Texas Am. AsphaltCorp. v. Walker, 177.F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Tex. 1959) ; Edst-
ern States Petroleum & Chem. .Corp. v. Walker, P77 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
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Another issue raised by Texas-American was based upon section
twelve of the then current regulations, which provided the authority to
allocate imports of crude oil by a refiner who was unable to obtain
quantities of domestic crude oil by ordinary and continuous means, such
as barges, pipelines, or tankers, "sufficient to meet his minimum require-
ments." To this sufficiency, Texas-American would have read into the
regulations the words "efficiently and economically." The court pointed
out, however, that Texas-American was able to obtain domestic crude
oil continuously. The circumstance that the type of crude oil locally
and continuously obtainable was not the best and most economical type
for the company's operation did not require the Administrator to grant
an allocation. This, again, is an example of reasonable regulation that
by its very nature creates individual hardship as the equities are
averaged.
Eastern States Petroleum, on the other hand, had a history of re-
finery inputs, but desired a larger allocation than had been granted.
As in the Texas-American case, the holding turned on the indispensabil-
ity of parties. Eastern declared that it was not challenging the validity
of Proclamation 3279 or of the oil import regulation, but was just seek-
ing an adjustment in its allocation, on the grounds of hardship. The
essence of the hardships was that the company had failed to include all
of its planned imports in its submitted estimate and that it was ex-
porting some of its imports, for which it was not receiving credits against
imports. The court pointed out that there was no regulation providing
for export credits, thus implying support of the refusal of the Oil Import
Appeals Board to grant any relief on that score. Further, the court
declined to invade the administrative function of finding whether there
was any hardship that would merit special consideration.
In both cases, the district court noted that it was passing judgment
on the merits because of the likelihood of appeal. Due to the firmly
established congressional power of regulation of foreign commerce, as
well as its power with regard to national security, a wholesale attack
upon the program of mandatory restrictions is not likely to meet with
success. While further litigation is to be expected, it is most likely to
be confined to that narrow field where, under present administrative
law, there is an occasional chance of success-i.e., the arbitrariness or
capriciousness of the regulations or the administration thereof.
It, therefore, appears that a lawful, reasonable, and perhaps man-
ageable system of equitably allocating imports has evolved from the
thirty years of national concern over the problem. It is the opinion of
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government experts that the voluntary program averted severe economic
difficulties in the oil industry. Whether the industry would whole-
heartedly join in such a conclusion is problematical (for some are im-
porters and some are not), but the continued support of the oil states
for import restrictions indicates, from a practical standpoint, that the
majority of industry members (in a political sense) is for oil import
restrictions. And they want more.'50 On the other hand, the Oil Com-
pact Commission is keeping a dose watch on the coal-industry backed
"national fuels policy," undoubtedly to see that the coal industry does
not obtain any synthetic support in its competition with petroleum, via
imports or any other method. 60
Perhaps one of the most difficult administrative problems of the
program will be to keep its function within the intended scope of its
creation--i.e., for the purpose of national (and now hemispheric)
security. Pressures for changing the mold of the program will in-
evitably be generated from "grass roots" economics as it affects politics
of the same ilk. Unfortunately, the voices of the guardians of the
bigger, longer-term picture, while agreed with in principle, are drowned
in the clamor of the daily pursuit of the Yankee dollar.' Admiral
Rickover, one of these voices, warned that our "belief that our high
standard of living guarantees political and military supremacy" is
potentially "our most dangerous illusion."'16 2  We can certainly ill-
afford mistakes in many or large "pragmatic adjustments" when it comes
to our national security, for they could mean the historic difference
between survival and requiem.
Overconcern about prices is a large threatened derailment of the
true purposes of the regulation. As mentioned above/63 the matter of
petroleum prices found its way into the President's March ioth procla-
mation. This was immediately picked up by a foreign-trade journal, as
"can entirely novel aspect of the new imports controls which could have
far reaching results. . . .""' No amount of study of the raison d'etre
' ' Dallas Morning News, Dec. 5, 1959, § 1, p. 8, col. 4. Here Senator Yarborough
(D. Tex.) was reported as describing the mandatory oil import program as "a slender
reed .... We need a stronger basis for the control of oil imports than this."
... N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1959, P. 45, col- 4: Compact Urges Close Watch on Fuels
Policy Mo'vement. See also Coal Aims to Undermine Oil's Markets, Oil & Gas J.,
Dec. 14, 1959, P. 41.
"'1E.g., Dallas Morning News, Dec. io, 1959, § i, p. 22, col. i: Rickover Says
High Living Standard May be Liability---Admiral Deplores Decline in U.S. Natural
Resources.
... Id. at p. 1, col. 2. ... See note 144 supra and'accompanying text.
18L426 PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE 126 (1959).
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of import controls can justify the use of price controls in order to curtail
what someone considers to be excessive profits or, on the other hand,
what someone envisages as an "operation bootstraps" to protect an ailing
and unable-to-compete-industry. It would be truly ludicrous if the
program were used for the latter purpose-for if the industry were so
ailing, then it would be high time that we turn our efforts, from a
national security point of view, into the stimulation of imports!
It may well be that rising demand will be the end of government
regulation in this field. The import quotas for the first half of ir96o
continue the trend of rising imports based on percentage of total de-
mand. What is happening in District V may well be the prelude of
what will happen in the other districts. There (District V), the demand
keeps increasing, while domestic production is not satisfying the need.
Even with the exemption of Canadian overland oil, the difference
jumped from a 265,500 barrels per day deficit between supply and
demand during the last half of 1959 to 279,ooo barrels per day (esti-
mated) during the first half of i96o.166
Current periodicals and discussion groups are showing much concern
over the enormity of the geometric "popilation explosion." Partial
realizations .of these predictions in the near" future will have an impact
on the reserves of all our natural resources. While one periodical sees
Europe and the United States safely through 1975, with petroleum and
additional imports satisfying most of the demand,' there will un-
doubtedly be an increased flexibility of choice and use of products for
creation of energy as dictated by economics. 6 "
This all portends that government regulation may eventually be, if
at all, in the field of rationing imports, rather than in restricting them!
VII
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
An attempt has here been made objectively to synthesize the legal
economic and political factors that have contributed to the evolution of
the segment of governmental regulation of the oil and gas industry
under study. It is clear that if our policy and lawmakers saw the prob-
165N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1959, p. 51, col. 3.. 1 Ibid.
167 27 PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE 41-43 (i960).
68 A. present example of this is the shift from oil to gas and coal. See Dallas Morn-
idg News, Feb. z8, 7960,.§ 4, p. 3, col. I. At col. 4-7, the headline is, U.S. Study
kees Long-Range Oil Need, with a report that a rise in demand in the United States
from 1959's 9)700,000 to 7,booooo barrels per day is predicted by 1976. Population
by that time is expected to reach 230,900,000.
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lem in such a fashion that controls ought to be different, then what the
law is would be quickly changed to conform. Thus, the role of the
jurisconsult in this field is necessarily limited. Once he had developed
the evolution and statutory basis of oil import regulation, the job of
framing the case for change rests with those who would have the change,
based upon their facts and reasons, whether they be political, economic,
or military.
In this regard, the foregoing study reveals a plethora of interests
to be weighed in the regulation of oil imports and a modicum of illum-
ination of the correct paths to follow. Stated otherwise, it demonstrates
that we probably do not know the answers to basic questions sufficiently
well to forge conclusions as to what policy changes, if any, should be
made. Summarized further and more cryptically, CcWanted: construc-
tive criticism, conclusions, and a denouement."
It would be desirable as a contribution to the welfare of this country
if one could conduct a legal examination of the conflicting parameters in
the import equation and offer a neatly packaged solution that, after
having balanced the interests of the oil industry, the consumer, and
national defense, could tender the best results for all. The writer does
not pretend such onmiscience.
In a democracy such as ours, restrictions on the complete freedom
of one to deal with his share of our wealth of natural resources have
come to us through the process of reluctant evolution rather than experi-
mental fiat. Individual voices sometimes cry out in indignant frustra-
tion, "There ought to be a law!" or "Why don't they do something
about it?" As a chorus, however, the vox populi is more temperate and
is not panacean in nature. The role of the federal government in the
formulation of our oil import policy has been described as pusillanimous
and has been criticized for its lack of coordination and consistency. It
is difficult to see how it could be otherwise in light of the Government's
efforts to. satisfy all. It has reached no heights or penetrated to no
depths other than has been demanded of it. It is the best product that
our political processes have been able to manufacture with the raw
material furnished by our expert economists and our defense establish-
ment. State conservation policies do, of course, play a part in the rate
of production of petroleum and its prices. 6 9 Responsibility for the
regulation of oil imports, however, belongs exclusively to the federal
government.
To the discerning, it should be abundantly clear from this study that
269 See text at p, 18 x.
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our policy difficulties have stemmed largely from the dichotomous
desires of keeping our oil and using it too. The facts here are eloquent,
without any additional articulation. An umbrella of policy attempting
to satisfy both of these desires must, by its nature, be ad hoc, pragmatic,
and as tractable as crisis demands.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the cautious policy with respect to these
bifurcated goals is proceeding successfully without any notable detriment
to the country, to the industry, or to the national defense. Complacency,
however, is not a logical predicate. This is because the present success
will continue only so long as the dimension of time and abundance of
resources do not demand an immediate accounting.170  But there's the
rub. When an immediate accounting looms necessary, it may be too
late. A boy never knows how many green apples it takes to make him
sick until he has completed his experiment. Happily, he is likely to
recover from his reckless prodigality and live to be the wiser. When
time and abundance of domestic resources reveals that our consumption
is rapidly overtaking supply of petroleum, the prognosis for the con-
tinued welfare of the nation is not as good as the little boy's. Legisla-
tion, belt-tightening, or late-arriving wisdom will not replace the
irreplaceable. The illusion about which Admiral Rickover spoke--i.e.,
that our high standard of living guarantees political and military
supremacy-will have been dissipated.'*1
This brings the wedding of national defense to a healthy industry
under the spotlight of examination. At this point, politics and economics
appear on the scene. "What's good for X industry is good for the
country" has been recently a popular (and maligned) slogan sum-
marizing our abiding faith in our capitalistic system. As noted above,
this philosophy has been criticized by Senator Douglas as containing
an "implicit syllogism" that concludes that the health of every industry
is complementary of our total economic welfare and national defense.
While one may generate a chuckle out of the niche that pregnant mare's
urine occupies in his examples of protected products, one must be sobered
when considering a replaceable product vis e vis a wasting and irre-
placeable one. Many a pauper has arrived at his status by contributing
too vigorously to the national economy by freely circulating his money.
This does not change his status as a pauper. Likewise, it must be con-
ceded that a healthy petroleum industry contributes to the general
welfare of the country. But the unanswered and unknown is how soon
such prosperity, dependent upon consumption, will, by the momentum
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of its enterprise, hurl itself out of existence. When this occurs, the
ruin will not be confined to the petroleum industry. It will cripple
the entire country, unless by that time other sources of energy, such as
atomic energy, have replaced hydrocarbons.
This brings us to the moment of truth, the point where the wealth
of the petroleum interests for the present is in conflict with the welfare
of the country in the future. Unless one is thoroughly dedicated to the
present and the dollar, there can be no quibbling about whether the
-nation or the petroleum industry should suffer. The industry has no
vested rights of supremacy to the detriment of all. Quarrels about
whether it is wise to maintain reserves in the ground for the purpose of
national defense must be stripped bare and the intent of the proponents
revealed. Greed and avarice did not cease with Teapot Dome.
Should we, therefore, rest content on the conclusions of the Special
Committee to Investigate Oil Imports that, inter alia, rejected as un-
sound the outright encouragement of increased imports in order to
conserve domestic reserves?172  It would seem that we should not. A
large part of the Committee's rationale appears to have been influenced
by solicitude toward the industry. 173 The interests of the nation and
the consumers were subordinated and rationalized.
Continued re-examination of our policy is recommended in the hope
that it may be molded to coincide with cogency, conservation, and con-
science. If it be decided that a hedge on the safe side will best serve
everyone, then everyone can share in the cost of conservation rather than
take the gamble on having the consumer and the nation bear the cost
of protection. 4 We should continue to examine courses of action that
have been rejected as being too costly, as presenting too many physical
problems, and as "contrary to the principles of free enterprise which
characterize American industry. '175  That is, we should continue to
seriously consider such courses of action as: (i) importing foreign crude
into the United States and storing it in completed fields or elsewhere,
and (2) enlarging government participation in exploring for oil reserves
that would be shut in when discovered. Furthermore, if the petroleum
industry is found to be ailing as a result of an overabundance of free
imports, perhaps a better way to treat the industry would be to let it
suffer until better days (which are sure to arrive) when imports will be
""See text at p. 194.
.. Perhaps the industry is in continued need of solitude as of the first half of 796o.
See What the Crude Market is up against, Oil & Gas J., May 23, 196o, p. 61.
,"' See text at p. 182. 27 See text at p. 194.
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welcomed by all. Or if the industry must be aided through a period
when imports are hurting it, we should consider a type of subsidy that in-
volves financial support only-that is a financial support that is not
predicated upon an accelerated withdrawal of our petroleum reserves.
Thus, the problem dearly points up, from the jurisprudential
side of legislative policy, that the most static part of the problem is the
varied opinion. To a large extent, these differences of opinion are likely
to continue until opinions are displaced by facts. To aid in the formula-
tion of legislative policy, the military and the economists have the task
of developing these facts. In the meantime, it is probably the wiser
course of the law to remain static.
National security pervades much of our current foreign and domestic
policy today. As such, national defensc and security is a handy whipping
boy, either pro or con, on a variety of subjects. The legal history of
the present import regulations shows that national defense considerations
were said to have been a prime factor in the present system of regula-
tion. Upon such a thesis, we are now proceeding. Is it wrong?
Will a future war last long enough for us to be concerned about vast
reserves of oil? If not, will our oil reserves have dwindled to such a
point that we could not sustain even a short war? How frequently and
of what duration may we expect "brush fire" wars? Are we better
gamblers than Nazi Germany was, recalling that a Nazi Germany de-
cided, upon a weighted judgment, to start a war (a decision that the
United States would probably never make) and found out that when
petroleum supplies failed, the end came? Will the atom and solar
energy sources antiquate the use of petroleum as an energy source of
importance before petroleum reserves are depleted?
And further, what about the over-all problem of foreign oil develop-
ment by American companies? Should this endeavor be encouraged or
discouraged? How are the values of statesmanship and national interest
going to be fitted into the mosaic of economic reality?
If Government encourages foreign oil development and then regu-
lates imports in such a fashion as to deny swift recovery of the invest-
ment, the investment is placed in jeopardy and government policy is
susceptible to criticism. If, on the other hand, foreign oil development
is officially discouraged, a void for Soviet exploitation will have been
created and a greater burden of drain will have been placed upon our
domestic reserves.
Breaking the unknowns down further into practical economics,
should we favor the few large integrated companies that gain more from
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imports than the independents, or the independents that seem to wield
more political power? How should quotas be affected by our foreign
policy, if at all? And militarily, do we have any real hope of evading
foreign submarines with our tankers, should the need arise? If so, how
bright are our chances in keeping the foreign land masses containing
petroleum out of unfriendly hands?
A look at the map and a cursory knowledge of the Soviet Union's
ambitions and capabilities of mustering a huge land force does not give
one cause for optimism. But, the independents would not conclude
therefrom that we should accelerate importation of Middle Eastern oil.
And finally, what about the oil import regulation itself. Is the quota
system economically sound?' 76 Certain changes have been made since
its original writing, 7 and only time will tell whether it will accoi-
plish its intended purpose. In the meantime, the lawyers and law-
makers should maintain an open and sympathetic ear for any addi-
tional factual data that can be produced by the industry, the politico-
economists, and the military.
Many studies have made economic and political appraisals touching
on the answers to some of the foregoing rhetorical questions. 7" These
have not resulted in sufficient unanimity of conclusion to dictate that our
policy should be different from what it is. When, within the industry
itself, the majors urge that freedom of imports will promote national
security and the independents urge that more stringent restrictions of
imports will promote national security, one must conclude that they
cannot both be right and that "national security" is given a meaning that
is promotional of self interests. This is a large part of the "problem"
in the regulation of oil imports.
The current legislation is flexible enough to meet whatever is
demanded of it in the way of increased or decreased imports. Admin-
istrative changes can be made without any additional legislation. The
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is charged with constant
surveillance of the program, and it is the forum through which any
administrative recommendations for change under current legislation
could and should be made.
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